Trusts--Enforcement of a Trust Created to Defeat Persons Whom the Grantor Imagined to Be His Creditors by O\u27Farrell, W. T.
Volume 35 Issue 1 Article 16 
December 1928 
Trusts--Enforcement of a Trust Created to Defeat Persons Whom 
the Grantor Imagined to Be His Creditors 
W. T. O'Farrell 
West Virginia University College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr 
 Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
W. T. O'Farrell, Trusts--Enforcement of a Trust Created to Defeat Persons Whom the Grantor Imagined to 
Be His Creditors, 35 W. Va. L. Rev. (1928). 
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol35/iss1/16 
This Student Notes and Recent Cases is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The 
Research Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized 
editor of The Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu. 
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
TRUSTS-ENFORCEENT OP A TRUST CREATED TO DE=EAT Thi-
SONS WHOM THE GRANTOR IMAGINED TO BE His CREDITORS.-A
conveys land in trust to B. The trust was created to defeat what
B had induced A to believe were his creditors. Actually, they
had no lawful claims against A. It is held almost unanimously
that equity will enforce such a trust.1  Despite the fact that the
grantor's intentions were not equitable, the courts hold in such
cases that the trustee cannot be allowed to take advantage of his
own fraud. The active, actual fraud of the trustee overcomes any
distaste equity might have toward enforcing a trust created with
such a fraudulent intent.
But what of the case where there are no inducements or mis-
representations by the trustee; but the trust is created by the
grantor of his own free will, for the purpose of defeating what he
believes to be his creditors? The West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals, in the recent case of Hall v. Linkenauger2 held that if
actually there had been no creditors in existence to be defrauded,
the trust would be enforced.
Perhaps the majority of the cases on the subject are flatly con-
trary to the position of the West Virginia court3 The reasons
assigned by these courts for refusing to enforce such a trust are:
One, that such enforcement would be contrary to public policy 4 ;
two, that it would be contrary to the spirit of the statute for-
bidding fraudulent conveyances3 ; three, that equity will not give
relief to a party unless he comes into court with clean hands.0 In-
cidentally, none of the courts draw any distinction between the
case where the grantor creates a trust for his own benefit, and the
case where he creates the trust for the benefit of a third party.
1 Brant v. Brant, 115 Ia. 701, 87 N. W. 406 (1901); Kervick V.
Mitchell, 68 Ia. 273, 26 N. W. 434 (1886); Boyd De La, Montagnie, 73 N.
Y. 498 (1878); Ingersoll v. Weld, 93 N. Y. S. 291, 103 App. Div. 554
(1905) ; Barnes v. Brown, 32 Mich. 146 (1875); Harper v. Harper, 85 Ky.
161, 3 S. NV. 5 (1887); Prewett v. Coopwood, 30 Mich. 369 (1853); Klee-
man v. Peltzer, 17 Neb. 381, 22 N. W. 793 (1885); Rozelle v. Vansycle, 11
Wash. 79, 39 Pac. 270 (1895) ; Wiley v. Carter, 77 Ia. 751, 42 N. W. 566
(1889); Wahl v. Taylor, 176 Ia. 353, 157 N. W. 856 (1916); Davidson V.
Carter, 55 Ia. 117, 7 N. W. 466 (1880).
2 142 S. E. 845 (W. Va. 1928).
3 Tantum v. Miller, 11 N. J. Eq. 551 (1858) ; Cameron v. Romele, 53
Tex. 238 (1880); Harris v. Harris, 23 Grat. (Va.) 737 (1873) ; Carson v.
Beliles, 121 Kan. 294, 89 S. W. 208 (1905); Pride v. Andrews, 51 Oh. St.
405, 38 N. E. 84 (1894); Jackson v. Marshall, 5 N. C. (1 Murphy) 323
(1809); Ratliff v. Ratliff, 102 Va. 880, 47 S. E. 1007 (1904); Holliday v.
Holliday, 10 Ia. 200 (1859); Kihlken v. Kililken, 59 Oh. St. 106, 51 N. E.
969 (1898) ; Poppe v. Poppe, 114 Mich. 649, 72 N. W. 612 (1897) ; Renfrew
v. McDonald, 11 Hun. (N. Y.) 254 (1877).
4 Tantum ,. Miller, supra, n. 3.
s Ratliff v. Ratliff, supra, n. 3; Jackson v. Marshall, supra, n. 3.
6 Carson 'v. Beliles, supra, n. 3.
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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
Yet it would seem that there would be much less reason for re-
fusing to enforce it in the latter instance than in the former.
A number of courts,7 however, have taken the same position as
the West Virginia tribunal, and it seems to the writer that they
represent the better view. As for the argument that such trusts
are contrary to public policy, and hence should not be enforced,
it may be replied that "No policy of the law is thwarted by a
mere motive, which cannot work injury to creditors. The law has
no concern with the futile intent to protect property from a claim
which its owner fears may be asserted against him, but which is
never asserted because it does not exist."' Subjective intent and
public policy, at best, are indefinite terms upon which to deny a
suitor redress.
As for the contention that the enforcement of such a trust
would be contrary to the spirit of the statute against fraudu-
lent conveyances, it should be observed that that statute is spe-
cifically directed against conveyances made in fraud of actual,
lawful creditorsP-and not imaginary creditors. It is doubtful
whether even as intangible a thing as the "spirit" of a statute
will apply to imaginary persons.
Most of the courts base their refusal to enforce the trust on the
maxim that "He who seeks equity must do equity." They say
that the trust comes into the court stained with the fraudulent in-
tent of the grantor, and hence equity will have nothing to do
with it. But in enforcing such maxims, equity should not place
standards of human conduct on too lofty a level. To demand that
a man's very intentions shall be pure, before he is given a remedy,
is certainly going far beyond the ordinary needs of justice. 'Law
deals with practical matters, and should be administered in a
practical fashion. Again, to refuse relief is to allow the trustee to
perpetrate an actual wrong by keeping the land, to which in good
conscience he has absolutely no right. To permit this would be
to strain after the shadow of intent, and permit the substance of
actual injustice. Usually these trusts are created by the grantor
to protect himself against a trumped up or illegal claim; and he
can see no moral wrong in so acting. Often the grantor puts his
entire property in such a trust. "Should the trustee, for nothing,
7 Smith v. Bowen, 3 N. C. (2 Hayw.) 296 (1804); Brady v. Ellison, 3
N. C. (2 Hayw.) 348 (1805); Vandever v. Freeman, 20 Tex. 334 (1857);
Rivera v. White, 94 Tex. 358, 63 S. W. 125 (1901); Kerrick v. Mitchell,
68 Ia. 273, 26 N. W. 434 (1886); Baker v. Gilman, 52 Barb. 26 (1868).
Also, Criss '>. Criss, 65 W. Va. 683, 64 S. E. 905 (1909); Thomas v. Ander-
son, 76 W. Va. 496, 85 S. E. 657 (1915).
8 Rivera v. White, supra, n. 7.
9 Italics ours.
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be permitted to reap the fruits of the lifelong, arduous labors of
the grantor? Equity and good conscience answer in the nega-
tive. "1o
-W. T. 0'FARRELL.
10 Hall v. Linkenauger, supra, n. 2.
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